Game Theory in Politics

Game theory has become an indispensable tool in international politics, offering valuable insights into the complex and strategic decision-making processes that govern the interactions between nations, international organizations, and non-state actors. As a mathematical framework for understanding strategic behavior and predicting outcomes, game theory allows scholars and policymakers to model and analyze the myriad of factors that influence the actions and choices of actors on the international stage. This chapter explores the role of game theory in international politics, highlighting its key concepts, applications, and contributions to our understanding of global dynamics. Additionally, we discuss the potential limitations and challenges of applying game theory in the intricate and ever-changing landscape of international politics.

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1. United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan Tshilidzi Marwala

1. Tshilidzi Marwala

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Marwala, T. (2023). Game Theory in Politics. In: Artificial Intelligence, Game Theory and Mechanism Design in Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5103-1_2

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• DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5103-1_2
• Published : 05 August 2023
• Publisher Name : Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore
• Print ISBN : 978-981-99-5102-4
• Online ISBN : 978-981-99-5103-1
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